Human Security Seminar 2025

Bridging theory and practice



Final Report

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EUROCORPS
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Human Security Seminar 2025 – Bridging Theory and Practice

1. Executive Summary

The 2025 Human Security Seminar (HSS) set out to address topics falling under the umbrella of Human Security (HS) and the Military Contribution to Human Security (MC2HS), with a focus on both NATO and EU perspectives.

By inviting guests and speakers from governmental, international and non-governmental organizations as well as attendees from NATO and EU institutions, Headquarters Eurocorps (HQ EC) aimed to increase staff awareness of MC2HS and HS dimensions and to map out both challenges ahead and the existing body of experience via a practice-oriented approach.

The decision to hold the event at the European Parliament served to underline the unique character of HQ EC, particularly its duality and strong ties to the EU, especially in light of its current and future roles as Force Headquarters for EU Rapid Deployment Capacity.

Over the course of two days on November 18 and 19, 2025, more than 100 participants from Eurocorps, the European Union, NATO, the United Nations, governmental and non-governmental organizations and academia came together to explore ways to translate Human Security principles into concrete action.

The **first day** of the Human Security Seminar focused on the European Union's considerations and approaches with regard to Human Security. The session started with speeches by Fabienne Keller of the Bureau of the European Parliament, Alain Berset, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, and the Commander of Eurocorps, Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz. Each underlined the relevance of Human Security for the EU as an organization, for EU leaders, and for military commanders and forces. David McAllister, Chair of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, also delivered remarks highlighting the relevance of Human Security from the Parliament's perspective.

In summary: the protection of civilian lives and democratic security should be core elements in the development of European defense concepts and capacities. As Eurocorps is a force for the European Union and NATO, it is uniquely positioned as a"laboratory" for integrating EU and NATO approaches to Human Security.

Alexander Grif from the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) and Sergio Da Silva from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) shared insights on Human Security in Ukraine and Gaza. The wars in Ukraine, Gaza and Sudan clearly demonstrate that Human Security is a mission-critical factor in any effective response. Marianne Fennema, from the Civilian Operations Headquarters (CivOps) at the European External Action Service (EEAS), Dr. Antje Herrberg, former Chief of Staff of EUCAP Sahel Niger Mission and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, as well as Majorie Hautot from the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) discussed how the European Union and its agencies implement Human Security principles in their concepts, planning and operations.

Day two was devoted to understanding how the military can meaningfully contribute to Human Security. Presentations from Tom Gooch, Head of the Civil-Military Liaison Branch at SHAPE; Sergio da Silva from UNOCHA; Paul Shewry from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); Alexander Gilder, Scientific Advisor and Daniel Linsdell, Human Security

Advisor at the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, offered valuable insights and examples of best practices for integrating Human Security into military operations.

In summary, the different presentations pointed out the importance of placing the Protection of Civilians at the center of military operations, and strengthening cooperation with international, governmental, and non-governmental organizations on humanitarian issues. Identifying the right approaches is crucial to ensuring the legitimacy of military actions, and reinforces the credibility of NATO and the European Union. Failure in this area would put both military personnel and civilian populations at risk. While NATO has defined Human Security and translated it into operational and strategic guidelines, further adaptation is needed to respond to evolving battlefield realities.

A **working group session** with four groups, held at the end of the second day, addressed several key questions relevant to the military contribution to Human Security:

(1) How can Human Security be more effectively integrated into commanders' decision-making processes?

(2) How can civil-military cooperation be adapted to the demands of multi-domain operations?

(3) How can Human Security be implemented in daily duties, exercises, and training?

(4) What are the implications of autonomous weapons, artificial intelligence, and drones for Human Security in conflict and crisis settings?

Participants tackled these questions by developing practical considerations and actionable recommendations.

The **closing remarks** at the European Parliament in Strasbourg were delivered by the Chief of Staff Major General Zenon Brzuszko. In his final comments he captured the central idea: 'Human Security is a multi-actor, whole-of-society task – meet each other before you need each other'. His quote stands as a fitting motto for the 2025 edition of the Human Security Seminar.

2. Summary of the Presentations

Human Security and Ukraine

Alexander Grif (CIVIC) delivered a sharp wake-up call to European militaries: the current European rearmament and 2030 defense planning documents almost completely ignore Human Security, protection of civilians (POC), and societal resilience, focusing almost exclusively on tanks, shells and drones. Using data solely from Ukrainian military sources, he illustrated how Ukraine's defense architecture evolved over the decade spanning 2014 to 2024, from a purely state-centric security model to a genuine whole-of-society defense in which civil society and the Armed Forces of Ukraine are closely fused. As proof, he pointed out that the General Staff and Ministry of Defence are now the most trusted institutions in the country – ranking far ahead of the President or any civilian authority. He used the example of mass civilian evacuations as a case study to demonstrate that POC considerations now directly shape fire missions, asset allocation, operational tempo and targeting decisions.

Human Security and Gaza

Sergio Da Silva (UN OCHA) described the current challenges and made a sobering observation: the Gaza war (2023–2025) has been one of the most lethal and destructive conflicts for civilians and humanitarian workers in modern history. It has seen an unprecedented speed and scale of killing, with 80–81 % of the territory destroyed and the highest recorded humanitarian death toll in a single crisis. Despite a ceasefire in place since 10 October 2025 and a dramatic post-ceasefire surge in aid deliveries (from a handful of trucks per day to 400–500), the core constraints remain. These include administrative blockages, item bans, indiscriminate attacks, and the creeping militarization of aid. The militarization of aid endangers both humanitarian personnel and civilians and must be resisted. Any future international force will be closely scrutinized to ensure that civil-military boundaries are not blurred. The needs of women and children have been systematically mainstreamed in planning and advocacy efforts with military counterparts. OCHA's daily Civil-Military Coordination and the Humanitarian Notification System have mitigated but never resolved the problem. The blunt bottom line: principled humanitarian access and genuine civilian protection in Gaza have depended almost entirely on relentless negotiation and external diplomatic pressure, rather than on consistent respect for IHL by parties to the conflict.

EU Human Security Framework

Marianne Fennema (EEAS CivOps HQ) presented the EU's formal doctrinal framework for Human Security from 1994 to the present. In practice, however, the term "Human Security" appears only once, and only very vaguely, in the entire Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU's twelve civilian missions are explicitly people-centered, non-executive (except residual Kosovo), and designed to build state-and-society resilience through advising, training, mentoring, and monitoring. These missions are required to mainstream human rights, gender considerations, anti-corruption measures, and civil society engagement. Her core concern is the political rhetoric in Brussels (especially the 2024–2025 "ReArm Europe" documents) has almost completely abandoned language around Human Security, human rights. This has created a clear disconnect between the EU's legal and aspirational DNA and its current defense-industrial priorities.

EU Human Security Approach from a European Parliament perspective

David McAllister (Member of European Parliament and Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs) delivered a high-level political vision for Human Security. In his view, the EU is the "why" of Human Security – normative, people-centred, and rooted in dignity and prevention. NATO represents the "how," with the operational capacity and discipline to protect civilians in the field. Both organizations now share the same intellectual foundation, beginning with the 1994 UNDP concept, and continuing with NATO's 2022 Human Security policy adopted in Madrid. They also share the same five focus areas: protection of civilians and children, armed conflict, conflict-related sexual violence, trafficking, and cultural property. Both follow a comprehensive and preventive logic. This level of overlap is unprecedented, especially since Finland and Sweden joined NATO. According to McAllister, the remaining obstacle is not conceptual but political and structural (Cyprus–Turkey veto, differing memberships, separate chains of command). His call: stop treating Human Security as two separate dialects and develop a single operational language through joint training, shared early warning, common POC protocols, and co-funded research. Eurocorps was explicitly singled out as an ideal "laboratory" for this kind of EU–NATO fusion.

EU Human Security Recentered

Dr. Antje Herrberg (Visiting Professor of Practice, College of Europe; former Chief of Staff EUCAP Sahel Niger) presented her experience of the practical application of Human Security within EU missions. Her core message: the EU's "beautiful Human-Security doctrine" has been left sitting on a shelf. Despite 30 years of documentation, it remains poorly operationalized, under-funded (0.5% of peacekeeping budgets allocated to prevention/dialogue), and often treated as an add-on rather than the center of gravity. Using real mission examples, including EUCAP Sahel Niger, the Gulf of Guinea, EUMAM Armenia, and EUTM Mali, Dr. Herrberg illustrated where Human Security had real impact on the ground. These included trust-building teams, women-led engagement, school visits, and local NGO partnerships. She also showed where Human Security efforts failed, particularly in Mali, due to rigid civil-military silos. Her provocative conclusion: stop mainstreaming Human Security into oblivion, recenter it explicitly as the core logic of every mission, give Heads of Mission far more discretionary space, slash bureaucracy, and move from a "task-driven" to a "relationship-driven" operational culture.

EU Preparedness Union Strategy

Marjorie Hautot (DG ECHO) presented the EU's new Preparedness Union Strategy. As the European Union is facing increasingly complex crises and challenges, the EU needs to be ready to protect its citizens and the key societal functions. The EU has officially acknowledged the importance of taking a proactive approach to preparedness. The Preparedness Union Strategy (March 2025) is the Commission's Action Plan to further develop a "Preparedness by design" culture and to enhance Europe's capability to prevent and respond to emerging threats – (e.g. conflict, hybrid threats, pandemic, energy blackout, …). The Strategy therefore focusses on an integrated all-hazards approach, a whole-of-government approach, which brings together all relevant actors, across all levels of government (local, regional, national, and EU) and a whole-of-society approach. This strategy emphasises the need to strengthen civil-military cooperation, notably through exercises. It also highlights the enhanced cooperation with partners such as NATO.

From 2025 onward, the EU promotes "dual use by design", integrating dual-use considerations into all of its infrastructure investments and capability planning (where 'dual use' means capable of being used by both military and civilian bodies), such as military mobility, mass evacuations, secure communications and connectivity, maritime security, cyber capabilities, and space assets and services. Building on the structure of the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) in Brussels, the Strategy also foresees the creation of a crisis coordination hub. Its objective is to continue and further upscale support to Member States in managing the cross-sectoral consequences of crises

CIMIC, the civil environment, human security and the comprehensive approach

Tom Gooch (Head of Civil-Military Liaison Branch, SHAPE) gave an operationally honest and up-to-date briefing on where NATO actually stands on Human Security in late 2025.

Key takeaways:

NATO has undergone a fundamental transformation since 2021–2022, shifting from an "out-of-area expeditionary" focus to a posture centered on high-readiness deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area. This Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) model now shapes everything – plans, force structure, command and control, and battle rhythm. At

the center of it all is a single objective: credible combat power that can deter both Russia and terrorist groups across the full peace-to-conflict spectrum.

Human Security is no longer a stand-alone policy area you wave a flag for. It has been deliberately folded into "civil environment factors" and "resilience" because that is the only language that survives in the current DDA planning and decision-making machinery.

CIMIC (J9) is the sole function capable of bringing civil environment and Human Security factors into planning processes and into the commander's decision cycle. If J9 is not properly resourced and plugged in, Human Security simply does not exist operationally – no matter how many summit declarations there are.

The civil environment is now the "third picture" (to be known as the White Picture) briefed to SACEUR alongside the red (adversary) and blue (friendly) pictures – a massive cultural win, achieved only in the last 18 months.

Resilience, especially the Nordic and Baltic "total defence" or "comprehensive security" model, is the new Trojan horse for embedding Human Security inside NATO. Nations have actually signed up to resilience baselines and civil planning obligations. By contrast, they only notionally committed to the 2022 Madrid Human Security statement.

NATO must never do what civilians can do better. CIMIC's job is to create a secure environment and coordinate effectively so that EU civil protection mechanisms can operate.

The biggest practical obstacles remain as CIMIC staffs are chronically under-resourced, and political constraints limit almost all meaningful NATO–EU information-sharing and joint planning at strategic and operational level. In addition, national gaps in civil preparedness have only recently begun to be addressed. Early efforts are now underway to map these gaps in areas such as evacuation planning, shelter provision, public alert systems, and whole-of-society mobilization.

Protection of Civilians, ICRC perspective

Paul Shewry, senior ICRC delegate, delivered a Human Security reality check from the ICRC's perspective. "Everything you are now planning for – Article 5, large-scale combat operations, protracted high-intensity urban warfare – will generate civilian suffering, prisoners of war (POW), and body counts on a scale NATO has not faced since 1945. Most of you are not ready, most of your plans ignore it, and most of your exercises magic it away." His core message:

(1) The operating environment has flipped after twenty years of small, rural counterinsurgency to protracted, high-tempo, technology-heavy, predominantly urban warfare driven by national survival.

(2) The 1949 Geneva Conventions are not optional extras – every NATO member state is a High Contracting Party. NATO itself is not, but that changes nothing.

(3) The biggest problem is not lack of law, but the systematic failure to comply, plan, resource, train, exercise, and evaluate compliance.

(4) If you get POWs, the dead, and the displaced wrong, you will:

- ⇨ Crystallize hatred for generations
- ⇨ Hand the adversary a permanent information victory
- ⇨ Make any eventual peace impossible

During the discussion, an audience member asked whether attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure are legitimate. The response pointed to the classic dual-use dilemma. The proportionality, along with second- and third-order effects, must be calculated. The ICRC's position is that civilian harm is almost always disproportionate and long-lasting, whereas military advantage is often temporary or illusory.

MC2HS challenge from a humanitarian perspective

Sergio da Silva, UNOCHA Civil-Military Coordinator, a pragmatic and field-focused humanitarian voice at the seminar, presented the MC2HS challenges from a humanitarian point of view. He spoke in terms NATO staff could actually understand, without moralizing, and delivered four clear messages:

(1) We are not your enemy, we are not your partner – we are a different category. Humanitarian workers will be on the ground in any Article 5 scenario in Europe, whether you want us or not. The only question is whether we help you or hinder you.

(2) Your biggest civil-environment headache will be mass civilian displacement inside NATO territory; in the millions, not hundreds of thousands. You do not yet have national plans that can cope with this. We have 30+ years of recent experience doing exactly this (Balkans, Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, Gaza). Use us early or regret it later.

(3) CIMIC/J9 is our primary entry point – always. We will look for you first. If you are not resourced, trained, and empowered to talk to us at the right level, the entire humanitarian community loses its single coherent channel into your headquarters, resulting in chaos, friction, and preventable civilian harm.

(4) Humanitarian Notification Systems (HNS) are a courtesy, not a legal shield.

- ⇨ They do not replace your IHL obligations.
- ⇨ They are voluntary for humanitarian actors (many NGOs will refuse to use them).
- ⇨ Once we hand you the coordinates, we lose control of the data.
- ⇨ We will never use HNS data for accountability or investigations. → So don't assume "blue icons on your map = legally protected".

MC2HS at the tactical level

The presentation of Dr. Alexander Gilder, scientific advisor at UK Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and Daniel Linsdell, Human Security Advisor at ARRC, was the most operationally concrete presentation of the entire two-day seminar. Two civilians embedded inside HQ ARRC (a deployable NATO corps headquarters) showed exactly how they translate the abstract political buzzword "Human Security" into daily staff work, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), overlays, targeting input, and exercise storylines for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) under Article 5.

Bottom line: ARRC is now the most advanced NATO corps-level HQ on Human Security integration. They are putting this in practice in peacetime, inside their own battle-rhythm, without waiting for new NATO doctrine or additional manpower. They are treating Human Security as a combat multiplier, not a "nice-to-have".

Core Message: Human Security is not crisis-management fluff. In collective defence, it becomes a warfighting necessity because:

- The adversary will deliberately weaponize the civilian population to fix, slow, and attrit us.
- Our own civilian harm (direct or reverberating) will be instantly weaponized in the information domain and will erode Alliance cohesion faster than battlefield losses.
- If we fail to understand the human environment better than the adversary does, we lose tempo and manoeuvre space."

(1) How ARRC actually does it – Tactical reality (2024–2025 exercises):

⇨ Setting the Mission
- G9 (CIMIC) + Human Security Advisor + G2 (military intelligence) + MP (military police) fuse a "Human Security Civil Factors Overlay" on SitaWare[1].
- Eight human security factors (UNDP 7 + UK "information security") are now formal civil-factor lines of effort.
- Every major urban area gets an Infrastructure Assessment (systems-of-systems map) → reverberating-effects modelling (power → water → health → displacement).
- Hundreds of cultural property polygons plotted (with Blue Shield/CPP Unit support) → No-Strike / Restricted Target List.

⇨ Protecting the Corps
- Logistics nodes deliberately sited away from cultural property.
- G8 procurement due diligence now screens contractors for human trafficking / conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)/child labor risks (mandatory under NATO policy).

⇨ Striking (Targeting)
- Human Security Advisor sits in Target Effects Working Group & Target Clearance Board.
- Mandatory CIMIC input on reverberating effects for every deliberate target.
- Dual incident-based + impact-based civilian casualties (CIVCAS) tracking (event logs + cumulative effects dashboard).
- "Strategic proportionality" monitoring – watching for patterns that could trigger political backlash, even if each individual strike is legally compliant.

⇨ Maneuver
- De-confliction SOPs for Host Nation/humanitarian convoys entering liberated urban areas.
- Static & dynamic IDP/refugee sites registered as "CIMIC Sites of Interest" → automatic No-Strike.
- Military Police Liaison Officers embedded with Host Nation police to obtain criminal intel on hybrid threats that also target civilians.

⇨ Sustainment & Rear Area
- G9 maps every protection referral service (CRSV, child rights violations, trafficking) in the area of operations (AO) with POC, eligibility, capacity → immediate referral battle drill for maneuvering units.

(2) Key Innovations / Leading Practices (2025)
- Human Security Advisor (OF-5 equiv. civilian) permanently embedded within the Command Group – not a temporary POLAD add-on.

[1] A battle space management IT system for displaying and managing military situations.

- An eight-factor Human Security framework formally nested inside NATO cross-cutting topics and the old ASCOPE/PMESII.
- Cultural property polygons (not just points) – only HQ implementing this at scale.
- Reverberating-effects modelling actually resourced and rehearsed (Eng. + G9 + GEO + Maven/Smart System).
- Dual-track CIVCAS tracking (incident logs + cumulative impact dashboard) → early warning of political escalation.
- CRSV / Children / Trafficking referral matrix pre-loaded for every exercise – units know exactly who to call within 30 minutes of an incident.

As strategic-level guidance for operationalizing Human Security at the tactical level remains limited, ARRC has taken the initiative to implement the necessary structures and procedures within its organization. The Corps has taken the NATO 2022 Guiding Principles on Human Security, the UK's JSP-905, and the new AJP-3.9 CIMIC doctrine, and has simply built them into their battle rhythm and SITAWARE overlays.

Final Panel Discussion

The final panel discussion was the seminar's culminating moment, an exchange between humanitarian heavyweights (ICRC, UNOCHA, CIVIC) and NATO's tactical innovators (ARRC's embedded Human Security experts). The core tension: humanitarians demand absolute neutrality and confidentiality to maintain access to all sides, while military practitioners push for integrated planning, shared data, and mandatory reporting to comply with Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and NATO policy. ARRC's Dan Linsdell and Alex Gilder demonstrated how Human Security is already being operationalized in corps-level exercises – from SitaWare overlays to dual-track civilian casualty tracking – without waiting for new doctrine. But the panel exposed fault lines: shrinking humanitarian budgets (ICRC has reduced staff by 25%, UNOCHA facing funding gaps) stand in contrast to NATO's growing demands for "civilian harm mitigation" tools that humanitarians see as potential mission-killers. Bottom line: in an Article 5 scenario, the civilian-military divide could paralyze response unless peacetime liaison and trust-building are accelerated now.

3. Summary of the Working Group Session

Four working groups (WGs) summarized two days of debate into actionable conclusions.

- WG1, 'Decision-Making Process', discussed the key question: *'How can Human Security be more effectively integrated into commanders' decision-making processes?'*
- WG2 'Planning' elaborated on the question: *'How can civil-military cooperation be adapted to the demands of multi-domain operations?'*
- WG3, 'Implementing', addressed the question, *'How can Human Security be implemented in daily duties, exercises, and training?'*
- WG4, 'Innovations', considered the question, *'What are the implications of autonomous weapons, artificial intelligence, and drones for Human Security in conflict and crisis settings?'*

Due to time constraints, the working groups had only 45 minutes for discussion, quickly jotting down the results. The overarching message: NATO is still treating Human Security as a "nice-to-have vignette" instead of a core warfighting function. Training scenarios remain cartoonish

(IDPs blocking a road → call a bus → problem solved), commanders are not personally confronted with the consequences of ignoring the civilian environment, and most HQs have no realistic resourcing plan beyond "hope CIMIC fixes it". The groups unanimously called for:

(1) mandatory, painful, Ukraine-level civilian injects in every major exercise;

(2) permanent peacetime networking with actual civilian experts (not just other uniforms);

(3) Human Security focal points in every staff branch (not just G9);

(4) acceptance that AI/digital tools are now the only realistic way to process civilian harm data of Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO);

(5) awareness of the dual-use of drones and autonomous systems, with positive and negative impacts;

(6) and a broader understanding of modern technology and the new capabilities and threats, which has to be integrated in operational and tactical decisions.

4. Conclusions

a. The evolving war in Ukraine has forced a shift in the country's defense architecture, moving away from a purely state-centric security model towards a genuine whole-of-society defense, in which civil society and the Armed Forces of Ukraine are integrated. Ultimately, the Ukrainian General Staff and the Ministry of Defence have become the most trusted institutions in the country, far surpassing the President and any other civilian authority.

b. Surveys of the Ukrainian population show that family and friends are the most trusted sources of reliable information, followed by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), which has gained this position thanks to the reliable information provided by national CIMIC.

c. At the same time, examples of the war show that mass civilian evacuations and connected Protection of Civilians considerations now directly shape fire missions, asset allocation, operational tempo and targeting of the Ukraine Armed Forces.

d. CIMIC (G9/J9) at NATO operational and strategic level (SHAPE) is the sole function that brings civil environment and Human Security factors into plans and the commander's decision cycle. If G9/J9 is not properly resourced and plugged in, Human Security simply does not exist at the operational level.

e. The "third picture" presented to SACEUR alongside the red (adversary) and blue (friendly) pictures underscores the growing Civil dimensions' relevance for military decision-makers.

f. The example of ARRC with two senior civilian advisors embedded within the military HQ – the POLAD and the Human Security Advisor (HSAD) – highlights the Command Group's need for quick access to civil environment assessment and support for Key Leader Engagements. Both positions serve as operational policy advisors and provide an alternative perspective – a "civilian view" – raising questions military cannot or will not ask. The HSAD assumes the role and function of a civilian challenge element within the military staff.

g. Service mapping is a critical tool to support Human Security referrals for victim-survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) and Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings (CTHB) violations, among others. CIMIC conducts a "Who does What, Where, When, for Whom" (5W) assessment.

h. CIMIC and Information Operations understand civilian Target Audiences in order to support Information Activities, particularly in amplifying the Information Activities of the Host Nation's efforts to protect and evacuate civilians, maximizing the effectiveness of own-force Information Activities related to advance warnings, and exploiting adversary failures to prevent harm or the perpetration of harm. A core challenge remains addressing and containing disinformation and misinformation disseminated deliberately or unintentionally by different actors or among peer groups. This has led to increased efforts to understand the information environment, particularly communication ecosystems.

i. The various presentations consistently highlight the importance of Civil Environment Analyses in understanding Human Security dimensions and related political, economic, social, and resilience factors. Implementation of CIMIC analytical capabilities at SHAPE, ARRC, MNCNE levels is aligned with operational requirements (EVAL, CREVAL) and enables the delivery of an accurate situational picture and sound assessments to support planning, decision-making processes, and ultimately, mission execution.

5. Recommendations

a. Even though SHAPE no longer uses the term 'Human Security' per se (HS aspects are integrated as civil factors), it remains imperative to promote Human Security as a cross-cutting element within operational and tactical HQs. HS must continue to be advocated, streamlined and integrated into staff processes through a designated custodian, which is G9. Therefore, although HS is not an exclusive CIMIC task, G9 still requires suitable capabilities and capacities.

b. G9 at Corps level needs to be re-thought from a whole-of-society perspective, where CIMIC plays a crucial role as the interface between military, civilian actors and the population. This applies to both Collective Defence as well as Crisis Response scenarios.

c. From the EC G9 perspective, a separate or additional Human Security Advisor (HSAD) position is not required. However, G9 should act as HSAD and have direct access to the Command Group responsible for MC2HS content. Additionally, a member of the Command Group should be designated as the Human Security champion (DCOM is recommended for a three-star level HQ, based on experiences at NRDC-ITA and EC during JTF exercise 2023/24) to emphasize the importance of MC2HS-related processes.

d. G9 resourcing needs to be adapted if a people-centered approach is to be considered as the center of gravity. The project to enhance CIMIC branch structure with analytical capabilities (EC Development Plan) has been confirmed by SHAPE and ARRC as an appropriate approach to understanding the Civil Environment already during peacetime. At EC level, with its duality and multiple standby roles, this capability is already needed for CSU and CRP purposes.

e. Further development and maintenance of the Corps HQ network with relevant Non-Military Actors must begin already in a peace establishment environment. To support this, a sufficient number of CMR liaison officers is essential. Additionally, G9 working desks

must have the necessary technical capabilities to conduct unclassified VTCs and access social networks.

f. Eurocorps should serve as an ideal "laboratory" for integrating EU and NATO approaches to Human Security. This experimental model should be formalized and promoted for use in STRATCOM as well.

g. Ultimately, Human Security should not be treated as two separate disciplines, but rather as a single operational language. This can be achieved through joint training, shared early warning systems, common Protection of Civilians protocols and co-funded research. However, to implement this, it remains crucial to ensure that personnel incorporate HS/MC2HS considerations into their work and include corresponding measures within SOPs/SOIs.

h. The Command Group and high-ranking representatives (director level) of key military and civilian stakeholder organizations should be invited to participate in the presentation and discussion of results.

i. MC2HS should be reflected in the CRP as one of the Decisive Conditions.

j. Incorporating representatives of key civilian stakeholders during the planning phase of a mission would foster the integration of MC2HS.

k. Mission Analysis (MA): Protection of Civilians should be incorporated into the operational context. The MA should should assess the civilian situation, drivers of civilian harm, and any vulnerabilities.

l. CoA design: The likely courses of action (CoAs) of the civil environment should be considered alongside red and blue CoAs. Each CoA should be evaluated for its consequences, advantages and disadvantages in terms of harm to the civilian population.

m. COM decision: The commander should take into account injury, loss of life, and harm (ILH), protection of civilians, and mental health risks when selecting the CoA.

n. The Civil-Military Interaction Working Group (CMI WG) should continue to act as a EC-level forum in peacetime to educate staffs and assess day-to-day interactions with civil stakeholders (both locally and across the AOO/AOI). The EC example is viewed by sister headquarters represented at the Human Security Seminar as a model worth implementing in their own commands.

o. A designated CMI/HS Focal Point within each HQ branch ensures the integration of Human Security considerations into the assessment, planning and conduct of operations – provided the network of branch contacts is maintained and personnel are regularly updated and trained.

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